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INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES
'THEstatisticalstudy of time series has presented few more puzzling
problems to the economist than those concerned with the relations be-
tween interest rates and commodity prices. The apparently high corre-
lation between the movements of bond yields and the movements of
commodity prices has been accepted, not merely by the man on the
street but also by many professional economists, as virtually conclusive
evidence that interest rates and commodity prices must be causally
related in some extremely direct if not extremely simple manner. But
the prevalence of this conclusion has resulted more from the aggressive
assurance of a few hierophants than from a careful examination and
consideration by their disciples of either the data themselves or the
treatment of the problem by the masters.
The complete assurance that a persistent similarity between the
movements of bond yields and the movements of commodity prices is
so well established as to call loudly for explanation is typically ex-
pressed by John Maynard Keynes in his Treatise on Money. Mr.
Keynes, a.fter drawing attention to "the extraordinarily close correla-
tion over a period of more than a hundred years between the rate of
interest, as measured by the yield of Consols, and the level of prices,
as measured by the Wholesale Index-Number", goes on to add that
this correlation "is one of the most completely established empirical
facts within the whole field of quantitative economics" and concludes
that "it is very unlikely indeed that it can be fortuitous, and it ought,
therefore, to be susceptible of some explanation of a general char-
acter'
II,198. The reader should be very careful that he does not give more weight than
should be given to the expression "over a period of more than a hundred years"
in the above quotation. A high correlation between two long extended series is an
index of the closeness with which the two series can be expressed in terms of one
another fry a particular mathematical usually a straight line with two deft-
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As illustrations of how the relationship has been or can be demon-
strated, Mr. Keynes presents first a table comparing 'adjusted' com-
modity prices with the yield of Consols by five-year periods from 1791
to 1919 and annually from 1920 to 1928.2 The 'adjustments' consist
in increasing by 10 per cent the commodity-price figures for 1791—99,
1820—54, 1875—84 and 1926—28, by increasing by 20 per cent the fig-
ures for 1885—1914, and decreasing by 20 per cent the figures 'for 1915—
20. Mr. Keynes describes these 'adjustments' as "dampening down the
more violent movements" of the price
Leaving the 'adjustments' with the statement that, "whilst making
matters clearer to the eye", they are "not, however, at all necessary to
establish the correlation", Mr. Keynes proceeds to introduce some of
the statistical work of W. H. Coates and E. G. Peake. Mr. Coates,
comparing annual figures for the yield of Consols with annual figures
for the Statist index of British commodity prices, had foundthat
"the Pearsonian coefficient of correlation" between the raw annual
figures for the two series was, for tile period 1825—1924, +.893 ±.014
and, if the yields of Consols were lagged one year, +.903 ±.012. Mr.
Peake had found, for the years 1882—1913, high coefficients of corre-
lation between the Statist price index number and the yields of London
and Northwestern Railway Debenture Stock (r = +.880 without lag-
ging. and +.888 when the yield was lagged one year). He had also
found lower but still relatively high coefficients between the commoci-
ity price series and short term mOney rates during the same period.
Without lagging, the comparison with the average annual rate on
'floating money' gave r =+0.801and the comparison with the dis-
count rate on three months' bank bills gave r = +0.724. In each in-
stance, lagging decreased the coefficients.5
In his popular summary of the movements of commodity prices and
(Footnote 1 concluded)
nite constants. Now such a high correlation gives no proof that the series can be
as adequately expressed in terms of one another in their successive parts by the same
the expression "over a period of more than a hundred years"
might lead the careless reader unconsciously to assume.
2 Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid., p. 200. Considerable insight into the nature of these 'adjustments' may be
obtained by examining Chart 16 on which are presented annual data for (unad-
justed) British commodity prices and the yields of Consols.
See Coiwyn Report on National Debt and Taxation, Appendix XI, p. 101.
J. M. Keynes, Treatise Money, II, 202.INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 165
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the yields of British Consols, Mr. Keynes writes: 6 "The broad char-
acter of the statistics since 1820 can be summarized as follows. Prices
and Interest fell together from 1820 to 1850, rose together from 1851
to 1856, fell together in 1857—58, rose together from 1858 to1864,
fell together from 1866 to 1869, fell together from 1873 to 1896,
rose together from 1896 to 1900, fell together from 1901 to 1903,
rose together from 1905 to 1907, fell together in 1907—08, rose to-
gether from 1908 to 1914 and 1914 to 1920, and fell together from
1920 to 1923. And over and above these general trends, a number of
the minor oscillations of the two are in the same direction."
6 Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid.,p. 201.
The numbers of years in "these general trends" (in which the years 1865, 1870,
1871, 1872 and 1904 do not appear) are 31, 6, 2, 7, 4, 24, 5, 3, 3, 2, (7, 7), 4.
The 31-year period from 1820 to 1850 shows a very considerable dissimilarity in
the 'minor oscillations' of the two series. But the trend of each series is undoubtedly
downward throughout the period (see Chart 16). And the declines from the earli-
est to the latest year are almost identical. Prices (on the Sauerbeck-Statist index
used by Mr. Keynes) were 31 per cent and the yield of Consols 30 per cent lower
in 1850 than in 1820. The 3l-year period is the period covered by the first of the
"general trends".
But, in the 25-year period from the price minimum year 1849 to the price maxi-
mum year 1873 the two series show no such similarity of long term trend. The
Sauerbeck-Statist index for 1873 is 148 per cent of the 1849 figure, but the average
yield of Consols was, in 1873, the same as in 1849. It is true that the yield of the
high-yield year 1866 was 13 per cent higher than that of the low-yield year 1852;
but 1852 is three years later than the price-minimum year 1849, and 1866 seven
years than the price-maximum year 1873. Mr. Keynes does not present the
25-year period 1849—73 as the period of one of the "general trends". He breaks
it up into no less than four 'general-trend' periods—1851—56, 1857—58, 1858—64, and
1866—69. The analysis stops with 1869. No reference is made to the period 1870—73,
in which the commodity price index rose more than 151/2 per cent while the yield
of Consols hardly even fluttered—Sauerbeck's index for these four years being
96, 100, 109, 111; and the annual average prices of Consols 92.44, 92.71, 92.46 and
92.61.
Mr. Keynes' action in not breaking up the 1873—96 period seems wise. There arc
no appreciable bond yield movements corresponding to the two minor upswings of
atmual commodity prices during the period. On the other hand, the trend of each
series was undoubtedly downward throughout the period, though the commodit.y
price decline was much more rapid in the earlier years than it was in the later
and the bond yield decline much more rapid in the later years. The convex and
concave appe'arance of the two trends may be seen in Chart 16.
Mr. Keynes next states that the two series "rose together from 1896 to 1900" and
"fell together from 1901 to 1903". The first of these statements may be passed over
without comment, but the second calls for some hesitation. It is true that, from
1901 to 1903, with the data Mr. Keynes was using (Sauerbeck's index number ofINTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 167
Before coming to any decision as to the conclusiveness of Mr.
Keynes' various arguments, the reader should, of course, examine the
data.8 That's always a good thing to do! And it is especially desirable
in the present instance. Many readers are inclined to investigate for
themselves the statistical adequacy of a mere verbal summary. But
few have the hardihood to face boldly that mystic clincher of argu-
nient, a high coefficient of correlation. And the advocates of the vari-
ous theories concerning the relations between commodity prices and
interest rates have no compunction about how they use that terrifying
blunderbuss.
Professor Irving Fisher has for many years been intensely inter-
ested in demonstrating the existence and investigating the economic sig-
nificance of a time relation between the movements of interest rates
and the movements of commodity prices. He believes, as firmly as
does Mr. Keynes, that the statistical history of the two series demon-
strates an interrelation that "ought to be susceptible of some explana-
tion of a general character". Over and over again lie has marshaled the
(Footnote 7concluded)
commodity prices and A. H. Gibson's figures for the yield of Consols), prices fell
from 70 to 69 and yields from 2.917 per cent to 2.825 per cent. The yields for 1901
and 1903 are, of course, based on the prices of the new stock that the British Gov-
ernment had, in 1888, offered the holders of the old 3 per cent Consols. But the
Government announced in 1888thatthe new stock would carry 3 per cent interest
until April 5, 1889; 23/4 per cent interest thereafter until April 5, 1903; and 2'/2 per
cent interest thereafter until April 5, 1923, after which date the Government could
redeem it at par. Now the 'yields' that Mr. Gibson assigned to this stock are not
calculated on the basis of these conditions. They are calculated on the assumption
that the current rate would be paid in perpetuity. For example, the 1901 yield is
obtained from the 1901 average price by assuming that 23/4 per cent of par would
be paid in perpetuity '(the terms of the bond to the contrary notwithstanding). The
1903 assumption seems to be that the total payment of that year (2 9/16 per cent
of par, or one-quarter at 23/4 and three-quarters at would he the amount Paid
per annum in perpetuity. The average price of the bond was 94'/4 in 1901 and 903/4
in 1903. The correctly calculated yield was hiqher and not lower in 1903 than it was
in 1901. We have, in Chart 16, presented the Gibson yields. They are the yields
that are used by Keynes and Fisher. But they are not correct for the period 1888
to 1903 (compare Chart 16 with Chart 19 which shows prices of both series).
For the whole period 1896 to 1923 the reader may check up and weigh Mr.
Keynes' analysis by consulting not only Chart 16 hut also Chart 19(price data
for the two series).
Mr. Keynes does not present any "general trends" for the period after 1923
though his table (Treatise on Money, p. 199) gives prices and yields annually
through 1928.
8SeeCharts 16 and 19.168 EOND YIELIDS AND STOCK PRICES
evidences that high and low interest rates tend to accompany high
and low commodity prices. "These. high correlations do not neces-
sarily mean that the interest rate will always be high when prices are
high and low when prices are low, but the tendency toward this is
definitely established."And again, "...overlong periods of time
high or low interest rates follow high or iow prices by about one
year." 10
But Professor Fisher is not satisfied that the truly significant rela-
tion is between high and low prices and high and low rates. He finds
a high correlation between levels difficult to explain. His theoretical
analysis had suggested that interest rates (in terms of money) ought
to be high while prices are rising and iow while prices are falling. He
therefore asked himself whether the interest rate figures, which seem
directly dependent on price cannot be presented at least as ade-
quately in terms of price changes.
In The Rate of Interest (1907) he had offered evidence that short
term interest rates tend to be higher during periods of rising commod-
ity prices than during periods of falling commodity prices, and to be
functionally related to the rate of rise or fall. At the end of a rather
long statistical section, he writes: "We therefore conclude with great
confidence that, 'other things being equal', the rate of interest is rela-
tively high when prices are rising and relatively low when prices are
falling." 11 The tables upon which this conclusion is based contain
comparisons of 'bank' and 'market' short term interest rates in various
financial centers with the annual percentage rise or fall of commodity
prices during periods of rise and fall.
There is a statistical peculiarity of 'these early tables that does not
appear in the revised form in which they are presented in Professor
Fisher's later book, The Theory of Interest (1930). In the earlier
book, periods described as periods of rising (or falling) prices include
the final, but not the initial, years of rise (or fall).12 But; even in the
Theory of Interest, p. 431.
10 Ibid., p. 430.
11TheRate of Interest, p. 277.
1.2 For example, if annual average prices ran 100, 104, 108, 104, 100, 104, 108, 104
ad in/in.itum, each period of 'rising' prices would be assumed to consist of two years
with respective prices of 104 and 108; and each period of 'falling' prices would be
assumed to consist 'of two years with prices of 104 and 100. The average price
would, therefore, during years of 'rising' prices, be 106; arid, during years of 'fall-
ing' prices, 102. Such treatment of the data is, of course, to be peculiarly deprecatedINTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 169
later book, we find evidences of the difficulty of deciding objectively
how the 'periods' should be selected. For example, in the table13 that
compares London open market rates
14with'annual rates of change
in the price level', the first four periods are given as 1825—34, 1834—39,
1839—52 and 1852—57. An examination of the lowest line of (our)
Chart 16 would suggest not 1834 but 1832 as the bottom year of the
decline in prices (the independent variable) from 1825; and 1849,
rather than 1852, as the bottom year of the decline from 1839.15 But,
if we make the seemingly unimportant substitutions of 1832 for 1834
and 1849 for 1852, we seriously, affect the apparent significance of the
entire table. The correlation between. the interest rates (for each period)
and the rates of change in the price level (for the corresponding pe-
nods)falls from the low figure +0.33 to the insignificant figure
+0.23.16 And, if New York rates and American prices be used in-
stead of London rates and English prices, the results are even more
meaningless.17
By 1930, Professor Fisher himself was no longer enthusiastic about
the tables comparing 'bank' and 'market' rates with average annual
percentage movements of commodity prices. In the earlier book these
(Footno#e 12 concluded)
when the objective is to demonstrate that high interest rates accompany not high
but rising commodity prices.If rates were a constant multiple ofprices, they
would, with such treatment, appear to be higher during periods of rising prices
than during periods of falling prices—as would the prices themselves.
18 Table VII,p. 527, The Theory of Interest.
Theaverages of the Bank of England rates of discount contained in this table
need correction for the periods 1852—57 and 1858—64. They are averages of the
annual rates given in the table on p. 520 of The Theory of Interest. The rates
of that table reproduce, with a few corrections, a portion of the table that appeared on
ijp.418—20of The Rate of Interest. But some serious errors are uncorrected. The
annual averages of the Bank rates for 1853, 1854, and 1855 remain 2.7, 2.1 and 2.9
instead of the correct figures, 3.7, 5.1 and 4.9. The corresponding figure for 1859
remains 3.7 instead of 2.7. A correction of these errors would somewhat improve
Professor Fisher's case. But tile Opefl market rates, which we discuss in •the text,
present his case more strongly than even the corrected Bank rates.
For the years 1831-33, the price index Professor Fisher prints and uses runs 92.
89. 91, 90, 92; for the years 1848—53, it runs 78, 74, 77, 75, 78, 95.
16 The correlation for the period from 1858 to 1927 is only + 0.19.
17 Professor Fisher's table of New York rates and changes in American prices
(Table VIII, p. 527, The Theory of Interest) must not be used. The calculations,
and even the algebraic signs of that table, are inaccurate. For example, the period
1860—65, during which prices rose from 100 to 232 (on the price index used by
Professor Fisher), or at the rate of 18.3 per cent per annum, is described as a
period during which prices were at the rate of 14.3 per cent per anflum, çtç,170 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRiCES
tables constitute the backbone of a chapter. In the later book, they are
tucked away among the appendices. Indeed, in the te%tofthe later
book, the theory that the levels of rates are simply and directly related
to price changes is completely abandoned. On page 417 of The Theory
of Interest, we read, "A very brief examination of the charts below
indicates that there is little or no apparent relationship between price
changes and interest rates in any of the periods studied in either
country [Great Britain and the United States] except for 1898—1924
in Great Britain" (Professor Fisher's italics). On page 418, we read,
"These results suggest that no direct and consistent connection of real
significance exists between P' and j" 18And,on page 427,"Thestudies
of both the long term and short term movements of prices and interest
rates give very similar results. In both studies the r's are insignificant
when P' and i are correlateddirectly, either with or without lag—
ging.. .."
ButProfessor Fisher is not disturbed by this fact now that he be-
lieves that he has discovered that rates are really related to price
changes rather than to price ievels—though not in any such simple
manner as he once assumed and now rejects. That the coefficients
of correlation between rates and price changes are small, he now feels
is of no great consequence. "The small numerical value of r suggests
that the relation can be revealed only faintly by F' and i directly. But
a little consideration suggests that the influence of P' on i may be &c-
18ByF' Professor Fisher refers to rate of chcinge in commodity price level and
by i to interest rate (whether bond yield or short term rate). For a fuller discus-
sion o. the meaning of these terms see Appendix B.
19Thestudent of Professor Fisher's The of interest should consider very
thoughtfully the significance of comparing P' with a lagged i. For example, if lie
wishes to understand just how, in a particular instance, varying the lag can affect
the coeflicient of correlation as it does, he will examine with great care the par-
ticular pair of series that are being correlated. He will study with great technical
interest such data as those presented in the chart opposite p. 426 of The Theory of
Interest, in order to discover how a coefficient of correlation between quarterly
averages of short term interest rates and quarterly changes in commodity price levels
can be —0.63 without lag, —0.16 when rates are lagged two years, +0.17 when rates are
lagged four years, and reach a maximum (though it be no greater than +0.35) when
the rates are lagged six years—in other words when the quarterly changes in com-
modity prices are correlated with quarterly short term interest rates six i'eczrs ahead.
(See chart number 50, p. 426, The Theory of
And he might wonder how many more maximum and minimum values for r
could be obtained ifthe lags were extended, a year at a time, until quarterly
changes in commodity prices were being compared with quarterly short term in-
terest rates a century later.INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 171
sunied to be distributed in time——as, in fact, must evidently he true of
any influence. This hypothesis proved quite fruitfulin. my studies
several years ago, in the course of which the theory of distributed
influence or, if we wish to avoid the implication of cause and effect,
of distributed lag was developed in considerable detail." 20
The function that Professor Fisher uses to represent 'the aggregate
influence' of past price changes on present interest rates, he terms F'.
"Arithmetically, F' is merely a certain weighted average
of sundry successive P' 's."The weights are the natural numbers be-
ginning with unity.22 The most recent P' has the heaviest weight. For
example, if F' be a weighted arithmetic average of eight successive
F' 's, the weight assigned to the earliest F' will be unity, that assigned
to the next P' will be two, and that of the most recent P' will be
eight.
The coefficients that Professor Fisher obtained by correlating bond
yields and short term interest rates with F', are, in almost every in-
stance, higher than those he obtained by correlating them with P', but
lower than those obtained by correlating them with P. In other words,
rates and yields were usually more highly correlated with 'the weighted
average of sundry successive' price changes than they were with the in-
dividual price changes; but not so highly correlated as they were with the
raw prices. Before offering any suggestion as to the significance of this
fact, it is desirable to present some of Professor Fisher's statistical
results.
He applied the distributed lag (F') procedure to annual commodity
price and bond yield figures for three periods 23inGreat Britain,
(1820—64, 1865—97 and 1898—1924); and to one period in the United
States, (1900—27). For the per.iod 1820—64 in Great Britain, opera-
tionswith the'distributedlag'give• a maximum coefficientof
24 and direct correlation of theraw data a maximum coeffi-
cient of +0.57. note 25 For the period 1865—97, the 'distributed lag'
20 The Theory of Interest, p. 419. Professor Fisher's italics.
21.Ibid.,p. 419. See also note 18, this chapter.
22 Ibid.,p. 421, lines 3—6 mci.
23Breakingthe data up into 'periods' results, of course, in the mathematical equa-
tions or 'laws' relating the two variables to one another being (except by accident)
different for each period.
24 Read from Chart 46, p. 421, The Theory of Interest.
Read from Chart 53, p. 430, ibid.172 BOND YIELDS AMD STOCK PRICES
gives a maximum of ±O.8O,fl010andthe rawdata
Only for the period 1898—1924, does the distributed lag procedure give
a higher coefficient (+0.98note28)than. the raw data (+0.93 note 29).
Forthe period 1900—27 in the United States, the distributed lag
gives a maximum coefficient of while the corresponding
figure from the raw data is
31
After discussing British and American correlations.between P' and
bond yields, Professor Fisher has a few words to say about the use of the
P' procedure with American commodity prices and short term interest
rates. He writes: "A study of short term commercial paper rates in rela-
tion to short term price movements corroborates the evidence obtained
from correlating long term interest rates and price changes. The New
York interest rates on short term commercial paper have been correlated
with changes in the quarterly wholesale price indexes computed froin
monthly indexes of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics for
the periods 1890—1914 and 1915—1927." '32
For the period 1890—1914, he obtained from these quarterly data
a maximum coefficient between P' and i of by lagging i
four years. But, using F' in the form of an arithmetic average of thirty.
'successive P' 's'(extending, therefore, over a period of seven and
one-half years), he obtained a coefficient of +O.4l.IboteFor the
period 1915—27, he obtained a coefficient of +O.35,30t0between P'
and the quarterly short term rates of siz years later.36 But, by using F'
(Footnote 25 concluded)
Professor Fisher comments wistfully on the low figures for 1820—64. He writes:
'The British figures for 1820—64 give the lowest of any included in this study. These
low figures are possibly due in part to the less accurate price indexes in those early
years'. Ibid, p. 423.
20 Read from Chart 46, p. 421, ibid.
27 Read from Chart 53, p. 430, ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 423, line 23.
29 Read from Chart 53, p. 430, ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 423, line 26.
31 Read from Chart 53, p. 430, ibid.
32 Ibid.., p. 425.
Read from Chart 50, p. 426, ibid.
Read from Chart 51, p. 427, ibid.
Read from Chart 50, p. 426, ibid.
30 The text does not state what years each series covers; whether thrteen years in
each instance, that is, for example, 1909—21 for prices and 1915—27 for rates; or a
mere seven years, that is 1915—21 for prices and 1921—27 for rates.
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in the form of an arithmetic average of 120'successiveP' 's' 87(extend-
ing therefore over a period of thirty years) heobtained a coefficient
of +0.738.nbte
89
Thisis an appreciable degree of correlation. But the correlation be-
tween the razu prices (P) and the raw quarterly rates for
the same period is, without lagging, +0.709. And, if the
rates be lagged one quarter, +0.829. If the rates be lagged two quar-
ters, r =+O.89l.hlOte41
(Footrote36concluded)
for the period 1900—27, both types of comparison seem to have been made. See the
notations in the body of Chart 47, p. 422, The Theory of Interest.
Compare first paragraph of note 36.
38Thecoefficient of correlation is a measure of the degree of accuracy with which
the relation between the two variables may be represented by a particular mathe-
matical equation. There is always the chance that, when a period of time is broken
up into pieces and correlation applied to the variables during each piece, the mathe-
matical equations representing this relationship will differ greatly from piece to piece.
The burden of proving that these differences are reasonable or at least not absurd
is on the investigator who proposes the breaking up.
Now, if we interpret Professor Fisher's mathematical treatment of the problem
described in the text as he asks us to interpret it, we find ourselves faced by an
absurdity. The function 7 is interpreted by Professor Fisher as 'a weighted average
of sundry successive P' 's'. And, because the weights assigned to the successive P' 's
run 1, 2, 3 n, the variations in the influence of any particular price change
(i.e., a particular P') upon successive interest rates run n 3, 2, 1. Or, in the
words of Professor Fisher, "....theform of variation of the weights is ex-
actly—but in. reverse order—the form in which the distributed influence of P' tapers
off during successive periods of time" (The Theory of Interest, p. 420). But, while
the correlation coefficient for the 1890—1914 period is obtained by assuming that the
quarterly interest rates of that period are related in a linear manner to a F' that
contains 30 successive P' 's, the coefficient for the 1915—27 period is based on the
assumption that the rates are a linear function of a P' that contains 120 successive
F' 's. This amounts to asking us to believe, for example, that the influence on in-
terest rates of the change in price level that occurred during the last quarter of the
year 1897 faded out completely by the second quarter of the year 1905 and re-
mained zero until the first quarter of the year 1915 when it reappeared and did not
disappear again until the year 1927.
If this absurdity be removed by using the same 'distributed lags' for both periods,
the coefficients are greatly reduced. The numbers 30 and 120 (or at least some figure
greater than 90) are an essential feature of Professor Fisher's argument.For ex-
ample, if 30 be used for both periods, the 1915—27 coefficient is reduced from 0,738
to 0.52. If 40 be used, the coefficients are 0.60 and 0.34 instead of 0.738 and 0.41. If 50 be
used, they arc 0.63 and 0.11.(See The Theory of In/erest, Chart on p. 427.)
Ibid.,p. 427, lines 4—7 mcI.
Forthese data see The Theory of Interest,, Appendix Tables XIV and XV, pp.
•532 and 533.
41TheTheory of Interest, p. 431, lines 1—4.174 BOND YiELDS AND STOCK PRICES
As a statistical explanation of why the coefficients obtained by cor-
relating the raw datafor selected periods sometimes run so high,
the 'distributed-lag' theory seems very weak. In all but two of the com-
parisons made by Professor Fisher, the application of the theory
lowers the coefficient.43
And, even if it usually raised the coefficient, that fact would not
necessarily prove that rate levels were helpfully interpretable in terms
of past price changes.For only technically is F' a measure of price
change. As the number of P' 's included inis increased, the con-
figuration of P' (with such data as commodity price index numbers)
usually approximates more and more closely the configuration of F, the
original data44 The reason for this condition is that, if the month-
to-month (or year-to-year) fluctuations of the data are not too violent
(and they seldom are with commodity price index numbers), F' tends
to approximate a constant multiple of the deviation of the logarithm of
the present price from an arithmetic average of the logarithms of a
specified number of past prices. In other words, if for the original
data we substitute their logarithms, F' (as calculated from the original
data) tends to approximate a constant multiple of the deviations of
these (logarithmic) data from an uncentered moving average. The
levels of P' are, of course, affected by changes in this moving average,
but, if the average covers a sufficiently long period of time, the con-
figurationor 'shape' of the F' curve will tend to approximate that of
the log P curve, and therefore, unless the fluctuations of P are very
large, the configuration of the P curve also. It is questionable, there-
fore, whether, even if the use of P' raised the coefficients, we would
be warranted in assuming that it did so because F' was a 'weighted
average of sundry successive P' 's' rather than because it was a devia-
tion of log P from a moving base.
Prices and short term rates or prices and bond yields.
43 One of these two comparisons supplies the only coefficient of correlation men-
tioned in the summary section 'Relations of Prices and Interest Interpreted' (The
Theory of In.terest., p. 438). Professor Fisher there writes: 'The rate of interest
correlates very markedly with P', representing the distributed effect of lag. For re-
cent years in Great Britain [1898—1924], the close relationship is indicated by r =
+0.98when i is lagged and the effects of P' are distributed over 28 years.'
See Chaçt 48, p. 424, The Theory of Interest. Compare also the P and P lines
of Chart 49, opposite p. 426, ibid.INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 175
However, as the use of P' instead of P does not tend to raise the
coefficients, the suspicion naturally arises that the coefficients obtained
from using F' are as high as they are because of the degree of simi-
larity of configuration of F' and P; and not as high as when P is used
CHART17
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becausethe base from which P (in the form of log P) is measured
(the uncentered moving average) is not as good a base (distorting
to some extent the P configuration) as the simple horizontal straight
line base that correlation itself introduces.45
But these criticisms must not blind us to the fact that casual inspec-
tion strongly suggests that there is a problem. Over long periods of
See Appendix B.176 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
time the two series seem to go up and down togeth.er. High correla-
tions between them have been obtained and others are easy to obtain.40
But just what and how much do these correlations mean? We must
not forget that a high coefficient of correlation between two time series
should never be accepted as more than merely suggestive of even prob-
able statistical functionality, let alone causal relationship, until the
mathematical origins of the high correlation have been carefully in-
vestigated.
Does the high correlation exist with respect to both long and short
term movements, to both trends and deviations from trends? Ifit
exist for long term movements, are there many such movements or
is the high correlation primarily a result of one or two great move-
ments of the data? If it exist for short term movements, hdw consistent
is the statistical relation? Does it hold only for 'hand-picked' periods
or does it hold pronouncedly throughout the range of the data, as a
whole and by pieces? If it holds by pieces, does it do so without neces-
sitating radical changes in the mathematical equation or 'law' assumed
to relate the one variable to the other? Does anything that is known
about the series beyond the range of accurate numerical data make it
extremely probable if not almost certain that the long term or even
the short term movements are not highly correlated or are differently
i-elated to one another in such outside ranges?
It is apparent froni Chart 16 that the long term movements of the
data, for either England or the United States, are very few, and that,
because of the relative insignificance of the minor movements, these
long term movements control the coefficients of correlation. But, for
England, itis a rough and violent control. Both series were very
high in the early years of the nineteenth century, declined irregularly
into the late nineties of that century, advanced to great heights in
1920 and declined irregularly thereafter. But the irregularities are so
great as to require explanation. The 1798 peak in the yield of Consols
occurred sixteen years before the 1814 peak in commodity prices.
There is no movement of Consols that can be related to the almost
46Forexample, by using only a little statistical ingenuity in the choice of functions
and lags (and chicane in the choice of period), we obtained for forty-eight years
of American bond yields and American commodity prices a coefficient of +0.974
± 0.005. The period covered is the whole period from the close of the American
Civil War to the entry of the United States into the World War; 1866—1913 for
the commodity prices and 1869—1916 for the bond yields (the bond yields are lagged
three years). Both series are used in the form of logarithms. See Chart 17.INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 177
major reversal of trend in commodity prices from 1849 to 1873. And,
though yields eventually completed their 1921 and 1922 f all in the
thirties of the present century, they drifted slowly upward for ten
years (1922—31) while commodity prices were declining; only renew-
ing their collapse when commodity prices were ready to steady and
begin a slow advance (see Chart 19). Ten years late on the decline
instead of sixteen years early as in the early years of the preceding
century.
Superficially considered, the American picture may seem less erratic
than the British. Bond yields and commodity prices each show a huge
trough beginning shortly after the close of the Civil War and ending
in 1920. But, even in this period, the lags are very irregular. The early
peak in bond yields came five years after the peak in commodity prices.
and the beginning of the rapid decline was nine years later for yields
than it was for prices. By the the bottom of the trough was
reached, in the nineties, the lag was less than three years; when the
peak of 1920 was reached the lag had vanished.
Outside the range of the great trough, it is more difficult to show
that American rates and prices were high and low or moved up and
down together. Is the great fall in yields from 1857 to 1863 and 1864
to he tied up with the minor drop in commodity prices from 1857 to
1861?Before coming to any such conclusion, it would be well to
remember that bond yields began their Civil War collapse only after
the gigantic rise of commodity prices had begun. There is every reason
for believing that this great fall in yields can he more properly con-
siclered as economically associated with the tremendous synchronous
rise in prices than with the negligible preceding decline. Similarly, the
gigantic snapback of yields after 1864 can be more satisfactorily tied
up with the synchronous collapse of prices than with the earlier rise.
Neither American series shows any appreciable trend from 1922 to
1929. But the violent rise in yields from the summer of 1931 to the
summer of 1932 occurred in the midst of a continuous and rapid' dc-
dine in commodity prices that lasted from the autumn of 1929 to the
spring of 1933; and the great rise in commodity prices that began in.
the spring of 1933 was accompanied by a continuous and violent
Though 1857 was a peak year for bond yields, the trend had been downward since
the early forties. The increase in the 'spread' between prices and yields during the















































































































































































































































































5INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 179
collapse of bond yields. These movements are well illustrated by Chart
18 on which monthly data are shown.
And even if the statistical relationship betwee.n the two series were
much closer and more regular than it is, what then? Ten years before
he wrote his Treatise on Money, Mr. Keynes, in his Treatise on
Probability,48 explained and emphasized the importance of distinguish-
ing between description and induction, correlation and causation. His
remarks are so neatly worded that we cannot resist quoting from them.
"The Theory of Statistics, as it is now understood, can be divided
into two parts which are for many purposes better kept distinct. The
first function of the theory is purely descriptive. It devises numerical
and diagrammatic methods by which certain salient characteristics of
large groups of phenomena can be briefly described; and it provides
formulae by the aid of which we can measure or summarise the varia-
tions in some particular character which we have observed over a long
series of events or instances. The second function of the theory is
inductive. It seeks to extend its description of certain characteristics
of observed events to the corresponding characteristics of other events
which have not been observed.
"The union of these two distinct theories in a single science is nat-
ural.. ..Butthis union is also the occasion of a great deal of con-
fusion. The statistician, who is mainly interested in the technical
methods of his science, is less concerned to discover the precise condi-
tions in which a description can be legitimately extended by induction.
He slips somewhat easily from one to the other, and having found a
complete and satisfactory mode of description he may take less pains
over the transitional argument, which is to permit him to use this
description for the purposes of generalization.
By the method of correlation tables and correlation coeffi-
cients the descriptive statistician is able to effect this object [the deter-
mination of the degree of correspondence between the two variables
within the field of observation], and to present the inductive scientist
with a highly significant part of his data in a compact and instructive
form. But the statistician has not, in calculating these coefficients of
observed correlation, covered the whole ground of which the inductive
scientist must take cognizance.. .
"Thetruth of this is obvious; yet, not unnaturally, the more corn-
48Seethe chapter on The Nature 'of Statistical Inference.180 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
plicated and technical the preliminary statistical investigations become,
the more prone inquirers are to mistake the statistical description for
an inductive generalization. This tendency...hasbeen further en-
couraged by the terminology in ordinary use. For several statistical
coefficients are given the same name when they are used for purely
descriptive purposes, as when corresponding coefficients are used to
measure the force or the precision of an induction. The term 'probable
error', for example, is used both for the purpose of supplementing
and improving a statistical description, and for the purpose of indi-
cating the precision of some generalization. The term 'correlation'
itself is used both to describe an observed characteristic of particular
phenomena and in the enunciation of an inductive law which relates
to phenomena [of the same type] in general [both within and without
the range of the observations] ."
Totreat a calculating machine as an instrument for the automatic
attainment of theoretically useful economic generalizations is almost
as unwarranted a procedure as was that of the Lagadan professor with
his "project for improving speculative knowledge, by practical and me-
chanical operations," by which "the most ignorant person... may
write...philosophy,poetry, politics, laws, mathematics, and the-
ology, without the least assistance from genius or study".5° To hold any
naive faith in the ultimate efficacy of throwing numbers into a mathe-
matical hopper may easily become as definite an obstacle in the path
of inquiry as was the assumption by the niediaeval schoolmen that it
was possible to obtain a comprehension of the world outside themselves
by the critical study of words and their meaning completely divorced
from the study of those things for which the words stood. And the
dangers that inhere in any such naive faith are, as the quotation from
Mr. Keynes has just suggested, extremely insidious dangers.
That no palpably absurd conclusion should ever be drawn from
the occurrence of even the highest coefficients of correlation is so well
recognized as to be assumed to merit no comment. No one suggests
that, because the graduated seasonal curve of temperature in New
York City shows (with a definite lag) a virtually perfect negative
correlation with the varying seasonal distances of the earth from the
sun, those variations in distance are the cause of summer and winter
in this city—great distance causing the heat of summer and lesser
John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, pp. 327—29.
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distance the cold of winter. Indeed, no coefficient of correlation is
ever thought of as offering even evidence, let alone proof, of causal
relationship ifits origin can easily be explained without any such
assumption and if any causal conclusions would conflict radically with
the facts as determined from evidence whose significance and inter-
pretation is open. to no such possibility of questioning.
But all too often when little or nothing is known concerning the
possibility of causal relationship between the two variables, the absence
of visible danger signals is unconsciously interpreted as proof of the
absence of danger, and a high coefficient of correlation is seized upon
with avidity as strong if not conclusive evidence of a direct and simple
causal connection.
At best (when the correlation is virtually perfect) this type of rea-
soning is often almost indistinguishable from 'induction by simple
enumeration', so contemptuously commented on by John Stuart Mill.
"It consists in ascribing the character of general truths to all proposi-
tions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of.
Whether the instances are few or many, conclusive or inconclusive,
does not much affect the matter...providedno other experience
of a conflicting character comes unsought." 51"Thename of Empirical
Laws," writes Mill in a later chapter,52 has been given "to those uni-
formities which observation or experiment has shown to exist but
on which one hesitates to rely in cases varying much from those which
have been actually observed, for want of seeing why such a law should
exist. - . .Iftrue at all,its truth is capable of being, and requires
to be accounted for."
Of course any great regularity of either coexistence or
sequence, or statistically, any extremely high and persistent "correlatiou"
between two or more variables (without radical changes in the functional
relation) should suggest strongly that the nature of the relation and the
possibility that it might be more than merely "empirical" should be
carefully considered. Hypotheses to explain the regularity should be
constructed and tested not merely statistical adequacy but also
for' logical consistency and plausibility; and for the accordance or
non-accordance with fact of the implications that they will necessarily
involve. And, even if no hypothesis can be formulated that stands up
Logic,Book III, Ch. III.
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under investigation and analysis, the assumption should not too easily
and cavalierly be made that the search for such an hypothesis should
definitely be abandoned.
Writers on scientific method, and even scientific investigators, have
sometimes too hurriedly assumed that unexplained apparent relation-
ships were non-existent, accidental, or at best niere empirical curiosities.
Bode's Law, according to which the relative distances of the various
planets from the sun were expressed by an extremely simple formula,
began as an arithmetic curiosity hut became accepted as demanding
explanation when, upon the discovery of Uranus, the distance of that
planet from the sun was found to follow the 'law'. But, when Neptune
was discovered and its distance from the sun was found to be qttite
different from that required by the formula, Bode's 'Law' became
accepted, not as demanding explanation, but as the perfect example
of accidental and unmeaning empiricism.
However, in recent years, astronomers have begun to suggest that
Bode's Law fails to cover the cases of Neptune and Pluto, not because
the relative distance of the planets from the sun should not be expected
to follow any 'law' but because of the inadequacy of the particular 'law'
Bode proposed. The suspicion is becoming general that Bode's Law
is empirical primarily in the technical sense in which so many engi-
neering formulas are empirical rather than in the more fundamental
sense in which any explanation of summer and winter in terms of
the varying distance of the earth from the sun would be empirical;
that it is empirical not because the relation it attempts to describe is
non-existent, or scientifically irrelevant, accidental and without funda-
mental significance, but because the mathematical formulation of the
law is of such a nature that, even if it covered all the facts with which
it is directly concerned, it not only could not be used to unearth new
facts and discover new relations by mere mathematical analysis, but
its implications would conflict with the body of more rigidly established
astronomical fact.
Merz could think of no niore damning indictment of Mendeléef's
periodic classification of the chemical elements than to suggest that
it might be as purely empirical as "the once well-known but now
[1896] forgotten law of But Mendeléef's classiflcationis
.no longer a mere curiosity. The recognition of its fundamental signifi-
History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Cen!nrv, I, 422 and 423.184 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
cance has grown steadily since Merz wrote. It is almost as easy to
make the mistake of assuming that a rational law is merely empirical
as it is to make the mistake of assuming that a mere empirical curiosity
is rational.
An empirical law or unexplained generalization that presents, in a
not palpably absurd form, an astonishingly adequate descriptive sum-
mary of observed facts usually merits careful consideration, but the
consideration it merits varies with the adequacy of the descriptive
summary. The summary is, at best, only an hypothesis. And, to the
extent that it is full of holes and exceptions, it loses its right to de-
mand consideration, let alone In this respect an empirical
law differs from a well established and seemingly rational generaliza-
tion that has been fitted into its proper place among allied scientific
generalizations, that helps to explain them and that is explained by
them. The unexplained perturbations in the orbit of the planet Uranus
led Adams and Leverrier to suspect the existence of some other as yet
undiscovered planet rather than to doubt the Newtonian formulation
of the law of gravitation. The calculations of Leverrier concerning
the size and position of the new planet were almost instantly verified
by Dr. Galle's discovery of the planet Neptune.54
The 'explanation' that lifts a generalization out of the empirical and
into the rational need not be of a directly causal type. Two variables,
such as the diameter and circumference of a circle, may be functionally
related without the suggestion of a causal nexus. A statistical 'law'
relating the height and weight of men does not necessarily suggest
that variations in either variable are caused by variations in the other.
Similar illustrations may be. taken from the field of economics. The
high correlation between the prices of substitutes or partial substitutes,
such as scrap and pig iron, is evidence of a functional but not of a
one-way causal relation. Different effects of the same cause yield ex-
aniples in which the variables themselves arc not causally related to
one another. For instance, the effects of year to year variations in rain-
Of course, an exception that needs an ad hoc hypothesis to explain it always casts
some degree of doubt art the original generalization until the ad hoc hypothesis is
verified. We must not forget that Leverrier's later suggestion that the unexplained
perturbations of the planet Mercury pointed to the existence of art undiscovered
planet (Vulcan) between Mercury and the Sun was never verified, and that the
perturbations of Mercury were explained only when Ejnstejn's hypothesis had
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fall on the year to year variations in the yield per acre of different
crops in the same area. The seasons carry a succession of agricultural
phenomena that may be described as functionally but not as causally
related to one another. The peak in strawberry production precedes
the peak in apple production, though the two production series are
not causally related.
But the fact that the 'explanation' that lifts the empirical into the
rational need not be of a directly causal type does not warrant throw-
ing entirely aside the concept of causation. Though an almost impreg-
nable metaphysical case can be made for the contention that the most
desirable objective of science, and indeed the only one that it can pos-
sibly attain, is to describe phenomena completely and in the simplest
possible manner, the unthinking acceptance of this doctrine may easily
lead to meaningless and useless empiricism. It is all too easy to forget
the tremendous significance that must be attached to the words 'com-
pletely and in the simplest possible manner'.
The casting out of the metaphysical devil of causation all too easily
leads to his return with seven other devils. The economist must beware
that the statistician, while seeming merely to describe mathematically
certain characteristics of the data, does not insidiously suggest a causal
relation, though the evidence be evidence only of the probability—or
possibility—of a functional one. He must not allow himself to be be-
fogged by professional patter about a 'multiplicity of causes' if there
is a definite possibility that the variables that are being statistically
compared are not themselves causally related. In such cases, he would
usually be well advised to forget that science is merely description and
to think in terms of a less refined but simpler metaphysics of verac
causae.
Now it is true that, in various countries and often for long periods
of time, the movements of interest rates (or rather bond yields) and
commodity prices have been such as to suggest th.at they might be
rationally related to one another in some direct and simple manner.
But, over the whole range of available data, the exceptions to this
appearance of relationship are so numerous and so glaring that they
cannot be overlooked. And the distribution of the exceptions is such
as to awaken the liveliest suspicion that any theory which proposes an
explanation of the apparent agreements should also explain the un-
mistakable exceptions. The exceptions are not scattered over the range186 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
of the data in a haphazard manner; they occur in 'bunches'. And, the
timing of these 'bunches' or periods of exception is such as not only
to suggest why the exceptions occur but also to throw considerable
light on the assumed functionality let alone causality of the periods
of agreement.55
Of course, if any formula that was not palpably artificial and ad hoc
described at all adequately the entire range of the data, it could not
reasonably be thrust aside without the most careful study of it
did so. But so far no one of the numerous attempts that have been
made to develop even a good descriptive summary of the supposedly
close relation has led to any such accurate and reliable account of
all that has actually occurred as to call insistently for explanation. And,
even if such a good descriptive summary existed, we should still, be
faced with the important question, what, if any, are the causal elements
in the statistical relation.
The common assumption that, between the bond yield and com-
modity price series, such causal elements exist and are important has
resulted not merely from the aggressiveness with which •readers of
economic literature have been assured that statistics support the con-
tention that a functional relation exists; but also from the apparent
simplicity of explaining why it should exist. But the 'explanations'
are numerous and some of the morepopular ones are mutually con-
tradictory. Any explanation seems good enough. Indeed, all too often
the elucidations sound suspiciously like what the Freudian psychologists
term 'rationalizations'. And this is but what might be expected. If a
formula be empirical in the fundamental sense that it is unrelated or
only distantly related to the true causes of the phenomena it attempts
to describe, it naturally tends to be difficult to explain. To ask why
seasonal variations in the temperature of New York City are caused
by variations in the distance of the earth from the sun or why the
strawberry crop gives rise to an apple crop three months later is to
In the statistical comparison of time series, mere absence of the highest degree
of correlation, if the absence results from a moderate degree of irregularity in the
relation over the whole period, may often reasonably be assumed to result from
the disturbing effects of other causal factors. But, when the hypothetical relation
sometimes disappears completely for years or even decades at a time, the investigator
should seriously consider the possibility that causal relationship either does not exist
or is of a more complicated and totally different kind from the simple and direct
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propound questions worthy of a lawyer cross-examining an expert
witness.
And, as we have already seen, of the mathematical relations that
are presented by the various writers on interest rates and commQdity
prices, those giving the highest coefficients of correlation are often
those that seem most suspiciously empirical and difficult to explain. For
example, if the data be assumed to support the contention that the
levels of interest rates or bond yields depend upon the levels of corn-
moclity prices, they indeed seem to prove too much. Professor Fisher
has himself remarked that " ...itseems impossible to interpret it
[the association of high and low rates with high and iow price levels]
as representing an independent relationship with any rational the-
oretical basis. It certainly stands to reason that in thelongrun a high
level of prices due to previous monetary and credit inflation ought not
to be associated with any higher rate of interest than the low level
before the inflation took place. It is inconceivable that, for instance,
the rate of interest in France and Italy should tend to be permanently
higher because of the depreciation of the franc and the lira, or that
a billionf old inflation as in Germany or Russia would, after stabiliza-
tion, permanently elevate interest accordingly. This would be as absurd
as it to suppose that the rate of interest in the United States
would be put on a higher level if we were to call a cent a dollar and
thereby raise the price level a hundredfold. The price level as such
can evidently have no permanent influence on the rate of interest except
as a matter of transition from one level or plateau to another."56
Butthe apparently high correlation between the levels of commodity
prices and the levels of bond yields is explained with great confidence
by the average businessman. It would seem permissible to lighten the
present discussion by digressing for a moment to notice some of the
explanations he offers. The commonest one is that interest rates and
bond yields are naturally and logically higher in periods of high com-
modity prices than they are in periods of low commodity prices because
in periods of high commodity prices "a dollar is worth less and hence
lenders will insist on borrowers paying more for a loan just
as they pay more dollars per bushel for potatoes". The argument is
that interest is a price—the price paid for a loan. For it to be high
when prices in general are high is therefore quite as natural as for
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the price of pig iron or the price of potatoes to be high when prices
in general are high. Incomes must be adjusted to the level of com-
modity prices. Lenders, therefore, will naturally insist on higher in-
terest rates when are high than when they are low.
Persons who are satisfied with the above explanation never bother
to ask themselves why borrowers, in a period of high commodity prices,
should not insist that lenders, in return for the promise of a specified
future money income, pay the borrowers more (present) dollars, be-
cause, in such a period, those dollars are worth less. But this idea has
actually been used to develop the conclusion that high commodity prices,
instead of being naturally accompanied by high interest rates, should
naturally be accompanied by low rates. Of course, as interest rates and
commodity prices show more of a tendency to be high and low together
than vice versa, the theory, as an explanation of the actual facts, is
worse than useless. But the reasoning, as such, is slightly more plau-
sible than that presented in the preceding paragraph. As the Red Queen
might have remarked, "I've heard nonsense, compared with which this
would be as sensible as a dictionary." The argument has been definitely
formulated as follows: "Money is valuable only as it commands com-
modities or services and therefore the price of money, which is interest,
should vary inversely with the price of commodities."
The origin of the strange fallacies of confusion illustrated in the
two preceding paragraphs is, of course, easily traceable to a muddle-
headed use of the word price. The rate of interest may, for some pur-
poses, be considered a price—but a different kind of price from the
0. K. Burrell, The Behavior of Bond Prices in Major Business Cycles (Uni-
versity of Oregon Studies in Business No. 13), p. 62.
In this instance, the author's apparent assumption that the theory was useful to
explain the facts as they are seems to have been made in a moment of inadvertence.
Not only the statement on p. 6 where he writes, "Bond normally vary in-
versely with commodity prices...", butalso the context on p. 62 seems incon-
sistent with the idea that he really thought that the rate of interest even tended
to "vary with the price of commodities". The context on p. 62 runs as
follows: "This long range rise in bonds and decline in commodities may be ex-
plained on two bases. In the first place, there is probably a causal relationship be-
tween the level of commodity prices and the level of bond prices. Money is valuable
only as it commands commodities or services and therefore the price of money,
which is interest, should vary inversely with the price of commodities. Probably a
more fundamental explanation of the long term relationship between commodity
prices and bond prices is that the same influences that operate to force commodity
prices downward cause bond prices to move upward, and vice versa."INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 189
price of commodities. The price of a commodity at a specified date
refers to an exchange relation between a specified quantity of money
at the specified date and a specified quantity of the commodity at the
same date. Potatoes are fifty cents a bushel when fifty cents of present
money will exchange for one bushel of present potatoes. The relation
is an exchange relation between different things at the same
Now a rate of interest refers to a quite different kind of exchange
relation. It is an excha.nge relation between the same thing at different
dates instead of an exchange relation between different things at the
same date. The relation is not between present money and present
something else but between present money and future money. Money
is on both sides of the equation.
And this brings up another phase of the absurdity inherent in the
'price' arguments—also unsuspected by their naive proponents. A price
is a ratio. A rise in the potato price of cotton is a fall in the cotton
p1-ice of potatoes. A high rate of interest indicates a high price for
present money in terms of future money. But a high price for present
money in terms of future money is a low price •for future money in
terms of present money. If either of these ratios is to be considered as
the same kind of a price as the price of a commodity, it surely should be
the price of future money in terms of present money and not vice versa.
Present money can be used to buy future money or present commodities.59
The recognition that the exchange relation to which a rate of interest
attaches is an exchange relation between present money and future
58Evenso-called 'future' contracts do not constitute real exceptions to this defini-
tion. Though a typical 'future' contract, such as a contract to buy and sell wheat or
cotton on a specified future date or within specified future dates may be entered
iuto at the present time and, though the exchange to which it refers may not actually
Occur until some time in the future, that exchange, when it does occur, will be of
different things at the same date.
The case in which money is paid in the present in exchange for an agreement to
deliver a commodity in the future is, of course, a hybrid. The price paid in the
present is the price that, at present, seems a proper future price under a 'future'
contract such as that just described, less a deduction determined by interest rate
considerations. It contains two elements, a (future) price element and an interest
rate element.Similarly with the purchase of a durable good such as a house.
Whether the house is to be lived in by the owner or to be rented, the future returns
are 'discounted'.
Itis this consideration that led us to suggest that the analogical reasoning back
of the second of the two theories we have been examining is,in some respects,
slightly more logical or •at least more verbally plausible than that back of the first
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money, between the same thing at different dates, and not an exchange
relation between different things at the same date has led to an ex-
tremely simple but also extremely naive explanation of why rates and
prices have moved as they have. Because the explanation exhibits some
real comprehension of the fundamental nature of interest rates, it of-
fers, from a purely formal standpoint, a much more logical explanation
than either of the two preceding ones. But it not only shows a deplor-
ably inadequate acquaintance with the historical facts to be explained
but also assumes on the part of borrowers and lenders a capacity to
forecast the future that is positively fantastic. It explains why almost
all men are either inordinately rich or excessively clever by drawing
attention to the effectiveness of the almost universal desire to be one
or the other—if not both.
When a lender gives up present money in exchange for a promise
to pay future money, he relinquishes, so runs the theory, a possibility
of present spending in return for a possibility of future spending. And,
if the purchasing power or spending potentialities of a present dollar
are greater than the spending potentialities of a future dollar, because
commodity prices are at present lower than they will be when the future
payments are to be made, the lender will insist upon and the borrower
will acquiesce in a higher rate of interest than would be agreed upon
by both if future commodity priees were to he lower than or even the
same as present prices. The theory asserts that the buyer of a bond,
for example, is not buying a series of future money payments but a
series of future commodities and services (which the future money
payments will be used to obtain). If the money prices of commodities
and services are to be relatively high in the future, the future money
income will necessarily buy but little. The present money price of the
bond will therefore be relatively low, and the 'yield' or 'rate of interest'
correspondingly high.
Of course, no one proposing this explanation of why rates and
prices have moved as they have would think of even suggesting that
borrowers and lenders, who are responsible for the movements of inter-
est rates and bond yields, are capable of forecasting with complete and
mathematical accuracy the future of commodity prices. They would
no more think of making such a suggestion than they would think of
suggesting that buyers and sellers of high-grade long-term bonds are
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rates. However, an enlightening first approach to the problems pre-
sented by any theory that interest rates and bond yields are completely
determined, or even usually greatly affected, by forecasts of future
commodity prices may be made by. beginning with just such absolute
assumptions. What would be the movements of short and long term
interest rates if borrowers and lenders, valuing future funds only be-
cause they could be used in the future to purchase commodities, were
able accurately to forecast future commodity prices; and, because of
their forecasts, so operated in the money and investment markets that
both short and long term rates were always logically adjusted to the
future movements of commodity prices—the short term directly, and
the long term indirectly (in accordance with the principle of 'invest-
ment indifference'60)?
Under these hypothetical conditions the levels of short-term interest
rates would vary with the rates of change of commodity prices. If
prices were advancing rapidly short-term rates would be high and, vice
versa,if prices were declining rapidly short-term rates would be low.
For example, if short-term rates could be assumed to remain constant
at, say, four per cent. per annum when the level of commodity prices
was not changing; then, during a period in which prices were rising
at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, rates would remain constant at
a little less than ten and a quarter (10.24) per cent per annum.61
If future commodity prices were to trace out a sine curve on a
logarithmic scale, short-term interest rates (plus unity) would trace
out a curve resembling the commodity price curve, but the maximum
interest rates would occur when the slope of the logarithmic price curve
was at a maximum, and the minimum rates when the slope of the price
curve was at a minimum. The maxima and minima of the short-term in-
terest rate curve would precede the maxima and minima of the com-
modity price curve by a quarter cycle.
See Ch. II.
Inaddition to the usual absurdities brought to light by a discussion of the im-
plications of any such contrary-to-fact assumptions as those we are making, a
peculiar and specific unreality is here suggested. If commodity prices were
at the rate of six per cent per annum, short-term rates should stand at approximately
two and a quarter (2.24) per cent per annum. But, as money is physically
not a perishable commodity, bona fide negative rates, that is negative rates that are
not measures of the value placed on some privilege or right unconnected with the
receipt of interest, are even theoretically quite impossible beyond the extremely low
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Furthermore (under the doctrine of 'investment indifference'), dur-
ing a period in which commodity prices were rising at a constant rate,
and in which short-term interest rates therefore remained constant,
the return that could be obtained by buying (without commission) a
bond of hypothetically absolute security and later selling it (also with-
out commission) would be a constant rate per annum—the same rate
as the short-term rate. If the 'current' yield of the bond, as the brokers
term it, in other words the yield on the arbitrary assumption that the
bond is a perpetuity, were less than the constant short-term paper rate,
the price of the bond would advance (and the 'current' yield decline)
continually throughout the period; if the 'current' yield were greater
than the constant short-term paper rate, the price of the bond would
decline (and the 'current' yield advance) throughout the period.62 Fur-
thermore, if, at the beginnin.g of any six months' period, the bond's
'yield to maturity were less than the short-term rate for the next six
months, the yield to maturity would have to decline still further during
that six months. But the bond would not necessarily advance in price.63
And vice versa.
If the movement of interest rates were completely determined by a
knowledge of the future movements of commodity prices and if it were
known that commodity prices were, in the future, to move up and
down in a sinusoidal manner, short term rates would, as we have seen,
move in a similar manner but reach maxima and minima a quarter
cycle early. However, as bond yields (to maturity) would he declining
whenever short term interest rates were above the yield of the bonds
and advancing whenever the short term rates were below the yield of
the bonds, the bond yields would tend to reach maxima and minima
62Ineach case, the assumption must be made that, because of complete knowledge of
the future of commodity prices and short-term. interest rates, the price of the bond
at the time of purchase would be such as to permit these price movements to occur
in such a manner as to end (at 'maturity') with the face of the bond plus the
last coupon.
63Ifa 6 per cent bond having 2 years to run sells for 103.81, its yield to maturity
is 4 per cent per annum. If at the end of six months (1¼ years to run) it sells for
$103.62, its yield is then 3¼ per cent per annum. The realized return over the six
months to a purchaser who bought at $103.81 immediately after one coupon payment
and sold at $103.62 immediately after the next would be $2.81 ($3.00 coupon minus
19 cents depreciation in price) on an investment of $103.81 or more than 2.7 per cent
Perhalfyear.Assumingthis to have been the semi-annual return on short-term
money, we see the bond yielding at both dates less than the short-term rate and
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at approximately (very shortly after) the dates on which commodity
prices reached minii'na and maxima. But the proponents of the theory
do not offer it as an explanation of why bond yields should be low
when commodity prices are high and highwhencommodity prices are
low, but as an explanation of why yields and prices are so often high
and low together.64
Of course, if only the near future of commodity prices (and hence
of short term interest rates) were foreseen, there would be no reason
64 Compare J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money, II, pp. 202 and 203.
"Nor can we regard thefactsas an example of Professor Irving Fisher's well-
known theorem as to the relation between the rate of interest and the appreciation
(or depreciation) in the value of money. Indeed quite the contrary. For the corn-
pensatory movements which Professor Fisher postulates relate to the sum of money
repayable a year hence against cash loaned today which will cover interest plus
(or minus) an allowance for the change in the value of money during the year.
Thus, if real interest is 5 per cent per annum and the value of money is falling 2
per cent per annum, the lender requires the repayment of 107 in terms of money a
year hence in return for 100 loaned today. But the movements to which Mr. Gibson
calls attention, so far from being compensatory, are aggravating in their effect on
the relation between lender and borrower. For he shows us that, if prices are rising
(e.g.) 2 per cent per annum, this will usually be associated with a tendency for the
capital value of long-dated securities to be falling 2 per annum; so that the pur-
chaser of long-dated securities will possess a year later a sum which is worth 2 per
cent less in terms of money which is itself 2 per cent less valuable, so that he is
4percent worse off, the two factors of change not balancing, but aggravating, one
another—whilst the variations in the rate of interest earned during the year in ques-
tion are too small to make much difference."
The theory here attacked by Mr. Keynes is presented most openly in Professor
Fisher's earlier book, Th.e Rate of Interest. Mr. Keynes' criticism is useful because
suggestive. But the reader should notice that he takes no cognizance of either the
.relation of 'investment indifference' which, theoretically, should exist between bond
yields and (known) future short term interest rates or the distinction between 'prom-
ised' and 'realized' yields. Professor Fisher's contention was that, if 'real' (or 'com-
modity') interest for the next year was to be 5 per cent per annum and it was
known that commodity prices were, during that time, to rise 2 per cent, a lender
would insist that, if lie were to lend his money for that year, 7+ per cent per anntini
must be 'promised' him. What effect his insistence should theoretically have on the
of outstanding long term bonds Professor Fisher does not It is, however, at
least imaginable that,if borrowers and lenders thought in terms of 'conimoclity'
rather 'money' rates and if they could see into the future of commodity prices for
one year hut not for more than one year, 'promised' yields on one-year loans could
follow Professor Fisher's scheme; though, in the absence of knowledge of future short
term rates beyond one year, bond prices and yields would not move in such a manner as
to create a condition of 'investment indifference' and hence the return 'realized' by
buying a bond and selling it one year later would not necessarily correspond to the 7+
ier cent yield 'promised' in the one-year note.194 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
for a relation of 'investment indifference' to arise between long term
bonds and short term notes. As a period of rising commodity prices
approached and began to be foreseen, both short and long term rates
would rise; the short term rates as soon as commodity prices actually
began to rise and the long term rates almost immediately, because the
foreseeing of the future high short term rates (which would come with
the rising commodity prices) would produce an upward adjustment in
the community's estimate of that peculiar 'average' of expected short
term rates that would constitute a bond 'yield'. Such a condition could,
of course, help to explain why 'investment indifference' is not a reality
of the market place, why bond yields are always being 'adjusted' to
short term interest rates but only to short term rates that are unmis-
takably imminent or have already materialized.65
There is still another type of forecasting theory. It is that the move-
ments of interest rates depend on forecasts of future commodity prices
but that the forecasts are not necessarily good or even conscious f ore-
casts. They are mere unreasoning carry-overs from the past, from
what has been occurring. This type of theory contends that the longer
a commodity price movement lasts the more do borrowers and lenders
consciously or unconsciously adjust their dealings with one another to
the assumption that the movement will continue, and interest rates
therefore continue to rise (or fall) as long as commodity prices con-
tinue to rise (or fall). This contention does not involve the proven
absurdity of assuming good forecasting to be habitual or even usual,
but the theory fails as a general explanation of the facts, though the
consideration it stresses may often be a minor and sometimes, tinder
peculiarly exceptional circumstances, a major factor in the determina-
tion of rates.66
Forecasts that prevailing price movements will continue tend to be
better than would be those based on the mere flips of a coin, only be-
cause commodity price movements so often gather very considerable
Ofcourse, even the near future of short term ratesis, as we have shown in
Chapter II, seldom foreseen with much accuracy. The 'adjustment' of bond yields
to short term rates is usually an adjustment to present or past rates. As an adjust-
ment to future rates, itis almost invariably overdone—as though the forecast were
that a present high level of short term rates was an important indication that those
rates would permanently or at least for a long time be much higher than had been
expected before they rose.
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momentum. They never last forever but they often last a considerable
time. Innumerable minor fluctuations may be superposed on major
swings but the usually like stormy waves on the open sea
or rolling hills and surface irregularities in a mountainous country
rather than like ripples on the flat surface of a small pond or ups and
downs in a ploughed field. As the crest or trough of a great wave is
reached, in other words when the future is no longer to be as the past
has been, the forecasting is almost always exceedingly bad; that it is
usually a mere straight-line projection of pastpricemovements soon
becomes all too evident. In the absence of startling whose
significance seems fairly plain (such as war or a runaway
currency inflation), rational as opposed to such mere projective fore-
casting is rare.67
At this stage of the discussion it is desirable to introduce and ex-
amine an assumption that is implicit in most of the theories that stress
the importance of conscious or unconscious commodity price fore-
casting. That assumption is that the only, or at least the overwhelm-
ingly important, reason why anyone should value a promise to pay
money in the future is that future money can be used, in the future, to
buy commodities. Indeed, the suggestion has often been made that
'money' interest was a mere artificiality and 'commodity' interest the
only 'real' interest.68
67 Professor Fisher, though he continues to strike the conscious-forecasting note,
tends to press down more and more resolutely on the soft pedal. And that seems
wise. The third sentence of Ch. XIV of The Rate of Interest (1907) states: "The
object will be to ascertain the extent to which, in the actual world, the appreciation
or depreciation of the monetary standard is foreseen by borrowers and lenders, and
provided for in the rates of interest upon which they agree." The corresponding
sentence of the corresponding chapter (XIX) of The Theory of Interest (1930)
runs: "The main object of this chapter is to ascertain to what extents if at all, a
change in the general price level actually affects the market rates of interest." In
many parts of the chapter of the later book, the language of forecasting persists but
it often seems to be a mere hang-over from the earlier book. The theory of the
"distributed lag" (presented in the later book) explains the movements of interest
rates exclusively in terms of past commodity price movements.
68 Compare Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest, p. 42.
"Is there, then, no absolute standard of value in terms of which real interest
should be expressed? Real income, a composite of consumption goods and .services,
in other words, a cost of living index in accordance with the principles set forth in
Chapter I, affords a practical objective standard. By means of such an index num-
ber we may translate the nominal, or money rate of interest, into a goods rate
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In recent years, this idea has gained considerable currency. Indeed,
many buyers of bonds rather sententiously assert that, before investing,
they attempt to forecast the cost of living. They insist upon the im-
portance of future 'corned beef and cabbage' as opposed to future
money. However, even the briefest will quickly disclose
the fact that in almost every instance they are not talking about their
own corned beef and cabbage but some one else's corned beef and cab-
bage. They personally are concerned only with future money. They
want money interest and if possible a money profit on the purchase
price of the bond. Even those investors 69forwhom the importance of
future money might seem fairly measurable by the future corn-
modities and services that it could buy, almost always th.ink an.d act
in ternis of money rather than in ternis of its future purchasing power.
With exceptions so rare as to be negligible, the only reason why bond
buyers or sellers talk about commodity prices is that they believe corn-
niodity price movements are highly correlated with bond price move-
ments. Why this is so they do not know. Introspection leads them no-
where. They themselves do not think in terms of commodities.7° All the
'corned beef and cabbage' talk is purely impersonal. It circulates like
gossip without serious scrutiny or even clear formulation.
Corned beef and cabbage theories grossly underestimate the im-
portance of money as undifferentiated purchasing power. Unless a
potential lender of money who intends to use the resulting income for
the purchase of consumers' conimodities knows that he will, in the
future, want only commodities that, because they do not deteriorate
with time, can be bought in the present, and, unless he also knows
exactly what commodities he will then want, he cannot forestall his
future needs by present purchasing.7' To the extent that. his future
Suchas retired business and professional men who are free from debt and are
living on the returns from their investments.
70Thisis, of course, not true when, as in the midst of an uncontrolled paper money
inflation accompanied by rapidly increasing distrust in the currency as such, the
probability of an extreni.el'v violen.t price movement seems great.
71Andhe cannot advafltageously forestall his future needs for even commodities
that will not appreciably deteriorate, unless the market price of such commodities is
to advance more rapidly than would money accumulate if placed in a superlatively
secure investment maturing at the time he will wish to use the commodities. For
instance,if the'lender' discussed by Mr. Keynes (see note 64)wereunwilling
to accept 5 per cent money interest for a year because commodity prices were to
rise 2 per cent during the year, he could not better himself by buying commodities
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wants will be for perishable goods, he will want future 'purchasing
power; and, to the extent that he does not now know wha.t those wants
will be, he will want rot a ticket good' merely for particular com-
modities but undifferentiated future purchasing power. He may, of
course, obtain this undifferentiated purchasing power by speculating
in commodities that he does not want to use or by engaging in a busi-
ness that would be advantageously affected by a rise in the general price
level. But the fact remains that what lie wants and should want is un-
differentiated future purchasing power—in other words, money not
commodities.
And, for every dollar lent by such an individual who thinks in terms
of future purchasing power (even if undifferentiated), there are many
many dollars lent by institutions whose managers do not and should
not so think. The corned beef and cabbage theory forgets that future
money can be used to discharge future money obligations as well as
to buy future commodities. The largest buyers of bonds are the banks
and insurance companies. To liquidate their future money obligations.
they clearly will need future dollars and not future commodities. If the
mana.gers of such institutions are interested in what happen.s to the
market value of their bond portfolios, and if they believe that the
movements of commodity prices affect the movements of bond yields,
they will, of course, be interested in the future of commodity prices;
just as they will be interested in the future of business activity. But
their direct concern is with dollars and not with corned beef and cab-
bage. The same is true of borrowers. Though, like lenders, they may
be affected indirectly by their intelligent or unintelligent pondering over
the possible influence that future commodity price movements may have
on future interest rates, they certainly do not, in their own business
calculations, usually measure or even think of future interest payments
in terms of relinquished future purchasing power. Unless they expect
a gigantic rise or a gigan.tic fall in commodity prices, both borrowers
and lenders tend to think in terms of money rather than in terms of
commodities.
And thinking in terms of gold rather than paper is only partially an
exception to this rule. Though, when such thinking occurs, the rela-
tively stable purchasing power of gold may be stressed, the gold is not
thought of as a commodity that, because of its physical characteristics,
is desirable for its own sake; but as another and better money. It is198 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRiCES
not wanted because it can be used to manufacture jewelry or tone
photographs, but because of its undifferentiated purchasing power. It
has been, and to a considerable extent still is, 'the money of the inter-
national republic'. It can be used as such or (at least till recently) con-
verted into a larger or smaller number of paper dollars. But, whether
to be converted or to remain unconverted, it is thought of as the su-
preme type of undifferentiated purchasing power.
If serious doubt arises as to the monetary soundness of the home
currency, a foreign money, especially if it be gold, may be thought of
as a more 'real' money. But, in the absence of any such doubt, the
purchase of a bond payable in the foreign money will tend to be
thought of by all, except those to whom for one reason or another
the foreign 'currency is really 'money', as a speculation rather than
an investment. During the long period in which the commodity pur-
chasing power of silver was more stable than that of gold, there was
no visible tendency for the inhabitants of countries on a gold basis
to think of bonds payable in silver as more conservative and less specu-
lative 'investments' than those payable in gold.
Of course if, in a particular market, there exist a general forecast
that the price of a foreign money in terms of the home money is to
rise or fall, and if there be in that market two bonds similar in all
respects save that the one bond is payable in the money of the market
and the other bond in the foreign money, then the relation between
the promised yields of the two bonds (calculated for each bond in
terms of the money in which its promises are made) will tend to be
affected by this forecast.72 The anticipated change in the price of the
one money in terms of the other money may, of course, be expressed in
terms of anticipated changes in the general purchasing powers of the
two moneys. But the introduction of these new (and presumably un-
known) variables is quite unnecessary. In determining the relation
between the two yields, borrowers and lenders are concerned with the
present and future prices of a unit of the one money in terms of a
72CompareProfessor Fisher's table giving, annually for the period 1865—1906 in-
clusive, the gold yield of British India bonds payable in gold and the silver yield
of British India bonds payable in silver, both yields being calculated from prices in
the London market. The Rate of Interest, pp. 266—68 and The Theory of Interest,
1).404.
Therelations between the yieldsthe table are far different from what they
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unit of the other money, entirely divorced from anticipated changes in
the general purchasing power of a unit of either money. It is not nec-
essary for them to forecast whether general purchasing power will be
increasing for one money and decreasing for the other or increasing
or decreasing for both.
Because of the desire for future 'money' there will, in any market,
tend to be a factor favoring bonds payable in the money of that market.
But this factor is of a monetary rather.than a commodity nature. It
exists whether the money of the market be appreciating or depreciating
in terms of commodities or of another money. Only if the purchasing
power of the market money declines so rapidly and far as to affect
radically the essential monetary characteristics of the market money
will the influence of this factor disappear or become reversed. In the
past, its importance seems. usually to have been definitely on the wane
when the inhabitants of a country in the throes of a currency inflation
have begun to stop ascribing their troubles to a rise in the currency
price of gold and to talk about a fall in the gold price of the currency.
By the time that most important contracts are being made in terms of
goldsome foreign currency, the influence of this 'home market'
factor has become reversed. The 'flight' from the old money is then
nearly complete. No longer is it the money of the country. 'At long
last' has conie recognition that the trouble is with the paper and not
with the gold. "'It is not I who am ailing', said the wizard; 'but there'
is one here very sick'."
But, in the absence of radical inflation and assuming, as we have
been doing, that the monetary obligations of the buyers and sellers are
predominantly in terms of the money of the market in which the bonds
are being bought and sold, it would seem that the importance of the
factor favoring bonds promising payment in that money would not
usually be appreciably affected by a change in the forecast of the future
price relations between it and some other money: The factor exists not
because of the nature of such forecasts but because of their uncertainty.
Its influence is usually therefore to a high degree independent of the
influence of those forecasts.
If, in the seventies or eighties of the last century, a retired London
banker, who neither had nor expected to have monetary• obligations
payable in rupees, had been weighing the relative investment attrac-
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have bought a rupee bond if he expected rupees (in terms of pounds
sterling) to depreciate over the life of the bond, unless the sterling
price of the bond when converted into rupees was such as to give a
higher rupee yield than the gold yield of an otherwise identical British
India bond payable in gold. But, in addition to the extra silver yield
he would have demanded because of his expectation of a fall in the
gold price of rupees, he would have insisted upon a further premium
for the uncertainty of the (future) value of his (future) rupee pay-
nients in terms of (future) pounds sterling—or (future) English
'money'. If, on the other hand, he had been a retired Calcutta banker
having and expecting to have only rupee obligations, he would have
been willing to accept a smaller silver yield than his forecast of a de-
preciation of rupees in terms of sterling would warrant. Because, in
actual fact, the primary market for the sterling bonds was England
and that for the rupee bonds was India and because of the peculiar
monetary and trade relations between England and India, it is very
hard to estimate how much or how little the 'spread' between the two
yields was increased or decreased by the combined operation of the
two factors, one favoring bonds payable in silver and the other favor-
ing bonds payable in gold.
But although the case for believing in the importance of the money-
of-the-market factor be extremely strong, we do not always find
unequivocal statistical assurance of even its algebraic sign. It is there-
fore only natural that statistical evidence of the influence of the often
almost supposititious forecasting factor (whether of the price of gold,
of commodities in general or of a foreign money) should seldom be
clear cut and unmistakable. To assume, tempting as in any particular
instance it may be to do so, that the influence of price forecasting can
be discovered from past rates and succeeding prices (as they actually
materialized) may be quite unwarranted. To reason that, because the
rates and the succeeding prices do not seem incompatible with an as-
sumption of good forecasting, the forecasting was good and the rates
weresodetermined may be to introduce merely a grossly ad hoc fic-
tional 'as if'. But to argue that, when rates (in the light of succeeding
prices) give no suggestion of good forecasting, they must neecessarily
have been determined by bad forecasting may well amount to the crass-
est of circular reasoning.
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flation) unequivocal statistical evidence of the mere existence of this
elusive factor is often difficult, to 'measure its influence (even in such
periods of pronounced inflation)is commonly found to be virtually
impossible. How large or small an influence forecasting of the (paper)
prices of gold and commodities (together with an almost certainly
varying degree of preference for bonds payable in paper) may have
had, for example, upon the (paper) prices and yields of American
railroad bonds during the Civil War years of the 1862—79 inflation is
certainly a 'puzzling question' even if not 'beyond all conjecture'.
Only a pale and flickering light is thrown on this question by the
relative prices of gold and paper bonds. Even if we completely ignore
differences in coupon. rates and are extremely liberal as to differences
in time to maturity, we still findit virtually impossible to discover
pairs of importan.t bonds identical or nearly identical in all respects
save their media of payment. They fail to fulfill one or both of the two
fundamental requi renients of direct statistical comparison, identity of
markets and equality of confidence in future payments.
Almost no instances occur of pairs of otherwise similar gold and
paper bonds that were traded in exclusively or even nearly so on one
and the same monetary market and that market alone; not merely
were they bought and sold on two or more monetarily different markets
but the relative importance of the various markets was usually not
even approximately the same for the two bonds. Indeed, in many
instances, it seems that neither bond was 'traded in to more than a
negligible extent on the primary market of the other bond; the primary
market for the paper bond being Boston or New York and the primary
market for gold bond London. The differences in assurance that
the promised future paynients would be niet as promised seem to have
been great though almost certainly unmeasurable. Contemporary news-
paper and magazine articles suggest strongly that both doniesti.c and
foreign confidence that the promised gold payments of almost any
specific American gold bond would be met (in gold) fell appreciably
short of the confidence that promised paper payments of paper bonds
of the same obligor would be met (in paper). This was unmistakably
true not only of Federal bonds but also, though to a less extent, of the
best New England municipal bonds.
The relative yields of such gold and paper bonds as were otherwise
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such market opinion as pictured by the financial commentators. But
there were so many unmeasured if not unmeasurable factors that it is
usually difficult to draw any very definite conclusions from the quoted
prices. In March 1864, the Federal Government issued the '5 per cent
Ten-Forties'. These bonds were payable at the pleasure of the Govern-
nient after any period not less than ten years and not more than forty
years from date. Both principal and interest were, by the Loan Act of
1864, payable unequivocally in gold. But, though the bonds were of-
fered to the public at par (100) in paper,onthe first day of offering
(March 26, 1864) only $875,000 was subscribed, the second day $130,-
000 and the third day On March 26, 1864, the price of
greenbacks in gold ranged ftom 58.91 to 59.00 per 100. The gold
yield of these bonds was therefore, even if they were to remain out-
standing for the entire forty years, more than 83/2percent per annum;
if paid in. gold at the end of ten years, the gold yield would be over 12
per cent per annum. Later, in the summer of 1864, the paperpriceof
the Ten-Forties was only 109 at a time when the paper price of gold
was 250. The gold price was, therefore, at that time less than 44 and
the gold yield, even to the forty year maturity, more than 11per cent
per annum.74 The paper yields of Federal paper bonds were running
high but at no such levels as these. Under the circumstances, it is dif-
ficult to say what part of the spread between the gold and paper yields
was caused by distrust of the gold promises and what part (if any)
was caused by the market's forecasting a rise in the gold price of paper.
We must not forget that, even as late as 1869, there was no great as-
surance that even the 5 per cent Ten-Forties would have their principal
paid in gold.75 The yields of gold and paper municipal and railroad
bonds present similar difficulties.
During such a disturbed period as the year 1865, for example, fluc-
tuations in the paper price of gold, because they affected confidence
in the gold promises of the government, did not affect the paper prices
of Federal gold bonds in which they might theoretically
he expected to do. If the yield in gold of a gold perpetuity were to
Hunt's Magazine, April 1864,p.303.
Thecomplete lack, at this time, of British confidence that the American Govern-
ment gold bonds would actually be paid in gold is seen in the fact that, in July 1864,
the gold 6 per cent Five-Twenties of 1882 were offered in London at 49 gold while
50 gold was being bid for New York Central 6 per cent pa per bonds of 1883.
See Coi!i;uCrciaj and Financiqi Chronicle, March 20, 1869, p. 257, column 2.INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 203
remain constant, its price in gold would remain constant and therefore
its price in paper would be a constant multiple of the paper price of
gold. But if, whenever the paper price of gold declined, confidence that
the bond would remain on a gold basis increased, the paper price of the
bond would not decline as much as the paper price of gold; indeed, if
the increase in confidence were sufficiently great, the paper price of the
1)Ofld might even advance. Now the year 1865 was a year of rapidly
declining paper prices of paper bonds and rapidly, though less uni-
formly, declining paper prices of gold. But from December 31, 1864
to March 1, 1865 the paper price of the Ten-Forties rose from
to while the greenback price of gold was declining from 226
to200. And, though the price of the bonds declined from 1023/4 on
March 1, 1865 to 913/2 on March 22 while the greenback price of gold
wasdecliningfrom 200 to 157, it advanced to 95 on May 17 though
the greenback price of gold had in the meantime declined further to
130. By November 25,thepaper price of the bond had declined to 91
though the paper price of gold had advanced to 147. But, even after
this decline, it was, relatively to the paper price of gold, much higher
than it had been at the beginning of the The paper yields of
American railroad bonds were during the year 1868 only a shade lower
than the peak yields of 1865, but confidence that the Ten-Forties would
he paid and paid in gold had increased so much (it would seem) that
(luring that year they sold as high as 1093/8. (paper) and never below
100 (paper) even though the greenback price of paper went down as
low as 1323/8.76
The movements of the prices of many Federal bonds suggest that confidence that
promised payments of principal in gold would actually be kept tended to increase as
maturity approached and no adverse governmental action occurred. On January 26,
1866, the Federal gold 6's of 1847 (due in 1867) sold at 1231/4 in paper with gold
at 1393/4, but thirteen months later (February 27, 1867), with gold at the same
price, tile paper price of the bonds had risen to 135.
Itis, of course, in a case like this, extremely difficult if not quite impossible to
estimate at all accurately the separate effects of increasing confidence in the gold
promise, possible (bad) forecasting of the price of gold, preference and possibly
changing preference for bonds payable in the money of the market, varying relative
influence of the New York and London markets, etc.
We must remember that an American who wished paper rather than its gold equiv-
alent but who bought the bonds because he expected the paper price of gold to ad-
vance or at least not decline appreciably would have faced a very serious paper loss
if the premium on gold had virtually disappeared before the maturity of the bond;
though an English purchaser would have been completely unperturbed by such an
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The great fall in the (paper) fields of American railroad paper
bondsduring 1862 and the abnormally low levels of those yields dur-
ing 1863 and 1864 might easily suggest that the railroad bond market
was at that time forecasting an imminent and prolonged fall in the
paper price of gold, or commodities, or both and commodities.
But one of the difficulties of this assumption is that, during the period
in which the paper price of gold (and of commodities) was rising
most rapidly and a forecasting of an imminent decline would there-
fore seem psychologically most improbable (paper) yields were f ail-
ing_—reaching their lows in July 1864, the peak month for the paper
price of gold (Six months before the peak month for commodity
prices).Of course, it is barely possible that, unwarranted as it may
seem to have been, the financial community was, during this period
of rapid depreciation of the currency, actually expecting a speedy fall
in the paper price of gold (and commodities) and operating on that
expectation.77
But, if this were true, why did (paper) yields begin to rise sharply
as soon as the peak in the paper price of gold was passed and the
expectation of a fall in its price became really warranted?It would,
of course, be quite understandable that they should have risen if the
impending fall in the prices of gold and commodities had all along
been fairly accurately foreseen.And, in the sense that the price
future proved not inconsistent with a probably unwarranted but possibly
existent general expectation, they may have been 'foreseen'.But even
this seems rather hard to believe—much like being asked to take seri-
ously the prophecies of Nostradamus.78
" See Wesley C. Mitchell, A History of the pp. 369 and 370.
"Nor ...isit surprising that business men failed to see what was coming; for
the course of prices depended chiefly upon the valuation set upon the greenbacks,
and this valuation in turn depended chiefly upon the state of the finances and the
fortunes of war—matters that no one could foresee with certainty. Indeed, there
was much of the time a very general disposition to take an unwarrantedly optimistic
view of the military situation and the chances of an early peace, Many members
of the business community seem to have felt that the premium on gold was artificial
and must soon drop, that prkes were inflated and must collapse."
78 The yields of some of the bonds in our list would seem to suggest that there pos-
sibly was a real forecast of an even more rapid return of paper to a par with gold
than actually occurred. For example, the Pennsylvania Railroad Siecond Mortgage
6's due1875 (Bond Number 9) sold at lower yields than the First Mortgage 6's
of the same road due in 1880 (Bond Number 10) every month from March 1864
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Before leaving these puzzling Civil War years, it is desirable to
remind the reader that, even if it could be known that the movements
of American railroad bond yields during the years 1862—65 inclusive
were as th.ey were largely because of conscious gold or commodity
price forecasting (which, whether accidental or not, would have been
good forecasting); that fact would not help us to explain why, as for
example during the period 1916—21 for commodity prices and 1917—22
for railroad bond yields (see Chart 18), bond yields and commodity
prices should ever be and not negatively correlated—unless
we are willing to introduce the deus ex inachinct of badforecasting.
But 'much study is a weariness of the flesh.Let us hear the con-
clusion of the whole matter'.In the first place, the absence of a
really persistent and uniform statistical relation between the series sug-
gests strongly that, even if the one series be to a greater or less extent
dependent on the other, the very nature of that dependence may vary.
For example, forecasting may be a negligible or an important factor
and, if important, may be good or bad. Thus, it is at least possible
that railroad bond yields were low during the high gold and com-
modity prices of the Civil War because a great fall in prices was,
whether warranted or not, being commonly expected; and high during
the high commodity price period centering round 1920 because of
conditions caused by the rise of prices but quite unrelated to (bad)
forecasting.
Of course, even in a period of uncontrollable inflation, high rates
and yields may be only partly the result of a sheer 'corned beef and
cabbage' complex. We must remember, for example, that during the
panic of such a period, with the increasing rapidity of circulation, corn-
niodity prices rise faster than the volume of the circulation and an
intense money shortage therefore occurs.But, even with such re-
finements, it is not very difficult to understand why rates and yields
should be hi.gh in such a period.If forecasting be assumed to occur,
(Footnote 78concluded)
made to signify, if (in spite of the results of our examination of the relative yields
of serial bonds in the present century) we assumed that the relation between the
yields of the two bonds was methodically considered, is that buyers and sellers felt
that the paper yield of the bond with the shorter maturity should, for the period
terminating March 31, 1875, be lower than the paper yield of the bond with the
longer maturity for the period March 31, 1875 to December 1880. But, in view
of the bond with the longer maturity being a First mortgage bond and the bond
with the shorter maturity only a Second mortgage bond, even this is curious enough.206 BONDYIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
bothits directand itsindirect influences can be relatively easily
analyzed.
But it is much more difficult to see why and how rates or yields
should be affected by price levels or price changes during p.eriods in
which forecasting would seem to be a quite unimportant factor.The
suggestion that, though there be periods in which conscious forecasting
is negligible, there are no periods in which unconscious forecasting is
unimportant, that when prices are rising the common though uncon-
scious forecast is that they will continue to rise, is not as helpful as
one might expect it to be.At best it offers an explanation of a usually
non-existent condition.To the extent that the problem suggested by
the statistics may be a real problem at all, it is why, in spite of numer-
ous and glaring exceptions, rates to some extent and yields to a much
greater extent are so often high when prices are high and low when
prices are low or rise and fall with prices, not why they are high when
prices are rising and low when prices are falling. And no question-
begging description of rates or yields as 'viscid' or 'sticky' is more
enlightening old explanation that a body was hot because it
contained n-inch phlogiston. Even if such a physical analogy as the con-
cept of 'stickiness' were thoroughly warranted, the question would
still remain, why are rates and yields sticky?
If the movements of commodity prices ever affect the movements
of interest rates and bond yields in other words if the two
series are ever, in the absence of conscious forecasting, more closely
related to each other than as two aspects of some more fundamental
condition, I suspect that the mere existence of long term debts (such
as are represented by bonds), with rigid future interest obligations,
is an extremely important factor in bringing about this result.
During a pronounced rise in commodity prices, though it may lead
to an increased logarithmic 'scatter' among the prices, there is a pro-
nounced tendency for the prices of nearly all things to rise.Though
wages lag, even they eventually rise.But (aside from the resump-
tion of payinelits on debts in default) interest payments on
debts do not rise.Now this condition may possibly have an ex-
tremely important influence on rates and yields.After a rapid
commodity price rise of one hundred per cent, the prices of the prod-
ucts of industry (except of those industries in which selling prices
are determined by law)will,in general and as an average, ha.veINTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES 207
doubled, but the burden of debt will remain virtually unchanged. Rela-
tively to prices that burden will, therefore, have been halved. The
market value of all plants (that do not have the prices of their products
determined by law or custom) will, therefore, in general (ignoring
depreciation and obsolescence) have at least doubled and that of going
businesses more than doubled. The ability of bu.siness to borrow will be
greatly more than doubled. And the urge to borrow
will also be greatly increased; not merely because the volume of new
loans necessary to continue the business at its old pace will have risen
with the price level but also because the price rise will probably be associ-
ated with a rise in the prospects for profits and hence few businesses
will be satisfied to continue operating at the old pace.
But there will be no corresponding increase in the ability and will-
ingness to lend.Not merely will the bond income of existing bond
holders remain unchanged but the prices of those things for which
they used to spend that part of their income which they did not invest
will have doubled.This great source of demand for new bonds will
therefore, instead of increasing, actually decrease. Similarly with the
(of course less important) demand for bonds from wage and salaried
persons. Their incomes will not have kept pace with prices. There
remains the great class of stockholders and business entrepreneurs.
But the business entrepreneur will, during such a period, be expanding
his business. And his silent partner, the stockholder, will tend indirectly
to do likewise. An even larger percentage of his income than usual will
go back into 'the market'. Either directly or indirectly, both the active
and the silent partners will be increasing their borrowing more than
their lending.
Moreover, as commodity prices rise and the burdensomeness of
corporation debt declines, second and third grade bonds become first
grade. The volume of bonds of the highest grade therefore increases
even more rapidly than the increase that results merely from new
issu.es. And it is the possible relation between commodity prices and
the yields of these highest grade bonds that the hypothesis would
attempt to explain.
But 'intriguing' as this all sounds, the hypothesis is almost as diffi-
cult to reconcile with parts of the record of actual rates and prices as
are some of the theories upon which we have so adversely commented.
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related, the 'mere existence of long term debts' may, as I am inclined
to suspect, be an extremely important factor—without being the only
factor needed for a complete solution of the problem of why and how
they are Eelated. Entia non sunt niultiplicanda praeter necessitam rules
only that causes are not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary.